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We examine a proposed auction algorithm using quantum states to represent bids and
distributed adiabatic search to find the winner 1. When the auctioneer follows the pro-
tocol, the final measurement giving the outcome of the auction also destroys the bid
states, thereby preserving privacy of losing bidders. We describe how a dishonest auc-
tioneer could alter the protocol to violate this privacy guarantee, and present methods
by which bidders can counter such attacks. We also suggest possible quantum circuit
implementations of the auction protocol, and quantum circuits to perpetrate and to
counter attacks by a dishonest auctioneer.
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1. Introduction
The advent of quantum computing has brought home some remarkable, though a
handful of, algorithms with varying degrees of computational advantages over their
classical counterparts 4,3 – viz. Shor’s factoring algorithm, Grover’s search algo-
rithm, quantum simulation, etc.. These algorithms harp on the quantum resources
of entanglement and superposition to gain their computational power. In order to
see real computational advantage using these algorithms over their classical coun-
terparts in the foreseeable future, one would need to maintain quantum coherence
of many qubits for much longer times than is possible now or likely to be realized
in the near future.
In 1, Hogg et. al. pick instead an economic application – auctions, and show that
even using a few qubits, there are many interesting advantages that one may obtain
using a quantum algorithm, over existing classical approaches to solve the auctions
problem. The auction method uses quantum superpositions to represent bids and
adiabatic quantum search to identify the winning bid. An auctioneer performs the
final measurement of the quantum state obtaining a unique outcome for the auction
while simultaneously destroying the bid states, thereby not learning the bid values
of any of the losing bidders, and hence preserving their privacy. By introducing
entanglement between bid states, participants can arrange for correlations among
their bids with the assurance that this entanglement will not be observable by
others. The method applies to a variety of auction types, e.g., first or second price,
and for auctions involving either a single item or bundled items (combinatorial
auctions).
In 1, the authors examine some ways bidders could cheat, and some ways to
counter such attacks by bidders. One such example that was examined was where
dishonest bidders could create a non-zero probability of a non-maximum bid to win
the auctions, by preparing a non-uniform superposition of their bidding preferences,
as opposed to a uniform superposition as prescribed by the protocol. In this paper,
we analyze various ways in which a corrupt auctioneer can try to tweak the protocol
to learn the bid values of the losing bidders without being caught, and at the same
time obtaining the correct outcome of the auction. We describe various ways by
which such attacks can be implemented, and ways by which suspicious bidders may
arrange to counter such attacks perpetrated by the corrupt auctioneer. We study
the behavior of the auctions protocol in the simple case of an auction for a single
item, and show how these attacks and counter-attacks work, and how they affect
the convergence time of the adiabatic search. We also describe quantum circuit
implementations of the auction algorithm.
The paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 overviews the auc-
tions protocol introduced in 1 and establishes the notation. In Section 3, we analyze
the performance of the protocol for a simple auction example with two bidders and
one item. Section 4 describes quantum circuit implementations of the auctions pro-
tocol. In Section 5, we discuss the possible attacks by the corrupt auctioneer and
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respective counter-attacks by bidders, and circuit implementations thereof. Section
6 summarizes the paper and discusses possibilities for future work.
2. Quantum Auctions by Adiabatic Search Protocol
In this section we describe a quantum auctions protocol that takes advantage of the
compact and expressive bidding language of quantum superpositions. The quantum
auction differs from its classical counterpart in two main ways:
(1) The bids are encoded using qubits, instead of bits - which allows for quantum
superpositions
(2) A quantum search algorithm is used to find the best allocation of items to the
bidders.
In our auctions protocol, each bidder selects an operator that produces the de-
sired bid from a pre-specified initial state (e.g., all bits set to zero). The auctioneer
repeatedly asks the bidders to apply their individual operators in a distributed
implementation of a quantum search to determine the winning bid. We use the adi-
abatic search method 14 since it applies directly to finding optimal values and allows
improving incentive compatibility with simple design modifications 1. It is thus bet-
ter suited to auctions than decision-problem searches such as Grover’s unstructured
search method 3.
Let us consider m bidders B1, B2, . . . Bm bidding on n items I1, I2, . . . , In. There
is an auctioneer who distributes p qubits to each bidder, i.e. a total of mp qubits,
all initialized in their |0〉 states, viz. |Ψinit〉 ≡ |ψinit〉⊗m = |00. . .0〉⊗m. Let us run
through a step-by-step development of our setup of the auctions problem and a
solution using quantum adiabatic search algorithm —
(1) Allocation: Let us define an “allocation” |x〉 as a mp-qubit ‘basis-state’ (i.e. a
2(mp) × 1 column vector). A ‘basis-state’ in the computational basis is defined
to be a product-state, that is a product of |0〉’s and |1〉’s. The allocation given
by
|x〉 = |Ii1 , b(1)i1 ; · · · ; Iim , b
(m)
im
〉 (1)
is interpreted by the auctioneer as — “Assign item Iik to bidder Bk and charge
him $b(k)ik ”, for each ik ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. A couple of points to note here are as
follows:
• In an allocation |x〉, each of the m ‘item-bid’ pairs is a p-qubit ‘basis-state’
out of which r = blog nc+ 1 qubits are needed to represent the ‘item’ (as
there are n items), and the remaining q = p − r qubits are available to
represent the dollar-value of the bid up to a ‘resolution’ of 2q possible
numbers.
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• An allocation |x〉 is called infeasible if and only if |x〉 assigns one item to
more than one bidder, or assigns no items to any bidder. A state that is
not infeasible, will be termed feasible.
• A bid value of b(k)ik = 0 will be interpreted as “Don’t assign item Iik to
bidder Bk.”
• An allocation |x〉 is called plausible if and only if for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m},
$b(k)ik is a bid-value that Bk is willing to pay for item Iik taking into
consideration all possible ‘correlations’ Bk might have with other people’s
bid-values for all other items that appear in |x〉.
• Define a “payoff” function F (.) for the auctioneer, so that F (x) is the
“value” that the auctioneer earns if he were to choose to announce allo-
cation |x〉. F (x) = 0, if |x〉 is an infeasible allocation. For a standard
‘first-price’ auction F (x) =
∑m
k=1 b
(k)
ik
is the total revenue the auctioneer
earns if a feasible allocation |x〉 (as defined above) is carried out.
• The p-qubit null state is defined as |φ〉 ≡ |00 · · · 0〉.
(2) Goal: The goal of setting up this problem is to first have the bidders col-
lectively create a uniform superposition of all possible plausible allocations
(which possibly might consist of some infeasible states). Now, we want to setup
the adiabatic quantum search algorithm, so that the search starts out with this
uniform superposition of all plausible states, and through several iterations of
operations on mp qubits the state slowly evolves into the plausible state in
that superposition that has the maximum payoff F (x), after which a measure-
ment of all the qubits reveals to the auctioneer the payoff-maximizing allocation
|x∗〉 with very high probability.
(3) Creating the uniform superposition: Because of the distributed nature of
this search, one way the bidders can collectively create a uniform superposition
of all plausible states, is if each bidder Bj creates a p-qubit bidding-state |ψj〉
– a state containing a uniform superposition of all their bid preferences.
|ψj〉 = |φ〉+
∑
i∈Ij
∣∣∣I(j)i , b(j)i 〉 (2)
where Ij ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of indices representing the items bidder Bj
is interested in bidding on. Each bidder is expected to come up with a 2p × 2p
unitary evolution matrix Ui, that creates their respective bidding-state |ψj〉
from the initialized p-qubit statea |ψinit〉 = |00 · · · 0〉:
anote that the condition imposed by Eq. (3) on the choice of the bidding operator Uj just specifies
the first column of the 2p × 2p unitary matrix Uj . It is obvious that there are many ways the
bidders can extend the first columns of their own bidding operators Uj into a complete orthonormal
(CON) basis of column vectors to construct the full bidding operator Uj . We later show in this
paper the adiabatic search algorithm that we describe works as desired when the bidders create
their bidding operators using a Hadamard-like construction.
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Uj |ψinit〉 = |ψj〉 (3)
If two bidders Bj and Bk wish to correlate their bidding preferences, they
would create a joint unitary operator Uj,k (a 22p × 22p matrix), such that
Uj,k|ψinit〉⊗2 = |ψj,k〉 6= |ψj〉 ⊗ |ψk〉, where |ψj,k〉 is the joint bidding state
of bidders Bj and Bk. Each bidder returns their bidding-states to the auc-
tioneer. The state of the mp qubits that the auctioneer now has is a uniform
superposition of all plausible states. Assuming no bid-correlations for notational
simplicity, we have
|Ψ0〉 = U |Ψinit〉
= (U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Um) |ψinit〉⊗m
=
m⊗
j=1
|ψj〉
=
∑
x:plausible
|x〉 (4)
where each term |x〉 in the above sum is a plausible allocation. Note that there
could be several infeasible allocations |x〉 in the sum.
(4) Adiabatic search: The adiabatic theorem can be used to design various quan-
tum search algorithms. If a system is created in the ground state of a ‘begin-
ning’ Hamiltonian Hb, and is made to evolve under the interaction of a slowly
changing Hamiltonian, such as
H(f) = (1− f)Hb + fHp, f ∈ [0, 1]; (5)
then provided that none of the higher eigenvalues of H(f) ever intersect with
the eigenvalue of the ground state of H(f) in f ∈ [0, 1] and provided the
evolution is done ‘slowly’ enough, the system ends up in the ground state of
the ‘problem’ Hamiltonian Hp, which is (by construction) the solution to our
search problem.
We construct a 2mp × 2mp diagonal matrix Hp whose diagonal entries are neg-
atives of the payoff values F (x) for all 2mp possible allocations |x〉 in the com-
putational basis (See Section III for an explicit example). The ground state of
Hp is thus the allocation vector |x0〉 corresponding to the lowest eigenvalue, i.e.
highest payoff F (x0).
We also construct another 2mp×2mp diagonal matrix W whose diagonal entries
d(x) are say, the Hamming weights of all the 2mp possible allocations |x〉 in the
computational basis. The ground state of W is thus the ‘all-zero’ state |Ψinit〉
with eigenvalue 0. We define the beginning Hamiltonian of the search as
Hb ≡ UWU†.
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The ground state of Hb is thus U |Ψinit〉 = |Ψ0〉 =
⊗m
j=1 |ψj〉 =
∑
x:plausible |x〉.
This is precisely the state in which we start out our adiabatic search. Now,
consider the following iterations of a discrete version of the adiabatic search
process:
|Ψs〉 = e−i∆H(f)|Ψs−1〉 (6)
= e−i∆((1−f)Hb+fHp)|Ψs−1〉
= e−i∆((1−f)UWU
†+fHp)|Ψs−1〉
≈ e−i∆(1−f)UWU†e−i∆fHp |Ψs−1〉
= U
(
e−i∆(1−f)W
)
U†e−i∆fHp |Ψs−1〉
= UD(∆, 1− f)U†P (∆, f)|Ψs−1〉 (7)
where P (∆, f) ≡ e−i∆fHp , D(∆, f) ≡ e−i∆fW , and ∆ is a small discrete pa-
rameter which represents a small time interval, over which H(f) can be consid-
ered approximately constant. Total number of iterations is S, and f = s/S, for
s = 1, 2, · · · , S. As each bidder’s Uj preferentially ‘rotates’ |ψinit〉 to a |Ij |+1 di-
mensional subspace of the 2p dimensional space of their p qubits, U =
⊗m
j=1 Uj
‘rotates’ |Ψinit〉 to a
∏m
j=1 (|Ij |+ 1) dimensional subspace of the full 2mp dimen-
sional Hilbert space of the mp qubits. For a special Hadamard-like construc-
tion of each Uj (see Appendix A), the above iterative search procedure never
goes out of the subspace spanned by the allocation vectors in the initial state
|Ψ0〉 =
∑
x:plausible |x〉. The search thus converges towards the allocation vector
|x∗〉 in the initial superposition that has the maximum payoff with probability
of success Psuccess → 1 — the solution to our problem b! The auctioneer then
measures the final state, and announces the winners and winning-bids for each
item.
(5) Properties: Some final comments and properties of the quantum adiabatic
search applied to auctions —
• The ‘time-step’ ∆ must be chosen in a way, such that the continuous
adiabatic limit T = S∆ −→ ∞ is achieved as S −→ ∞. One way to
ensure that is to chooseb ∆ = 1/
√
S.
• After the search converges, when the auctioneer makes a measurement of
all the mp qubits to find the winning allocation |x∗〉, all information about
the bid values of all losing bidders for each item is instantly destroyed.
Thus, the quantum auctions protocol protects the privacy of losing bidders.
bGiven that the adiabatic search is run with a sufficiently small ∆, and a sufficiently large number
of iterations S, the algorithm is indeed guaranteed to succeed – and by “succeed”, we mean that
the probability of the (honest) auctioneer getting the correct result from his final measurements
can be made exceedingly close to 1. Note that the process never succeeds with probability 1. As we
state in the paper, the ‘time-step’ ∆ must be chosen in a way, such that the continuous adiabatic
limit T = S∆ −→∞ is achieved as S −→∞. One way to ensure that is to choose ∆ = 1/√S. In
this limit, the probability of success Psuccess → 1.
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• Eq. 7 uses the approximation e(A+B)∆ ≈ eA∆eB∆. A better approximation
e(A+B)∆ ≈ eA∆/2eB∆eA∆/2 can be used to obtain the following second-
order version of the adiabatic iterations for the auctions protocol:
|Ψs〉 = UD(∆2 , 1− f)U
†P (∆, f)UD(
∆
2
, 1− f)U†|Ψs−1〉 (8)
• This protocol assumes that the bidders and the auctioneer do their respec-
tive parts throughout the running of the protocol honestly, as prescribed
by the above protocol. Further additions and modifications in the protocol
will be necessary to make it robust to corrupt auctioneers and dishonest
bidders who might try to tweak the protocol to cater to their respective
motives.
3. A Toy Example
In this section, we will look at a very simple four-qubit example to illustrate the
theory developed above to implement quantum auctions, and will examine conver-
gence behavior of the quantum adiabatic algorithm for this case. We will find it
useful later to refer back to this example to illustrate various aspects of quantum
auctions using adiabatic search. Let us consider a simple example with one item
being auctioned off (n = 1) amongst two bidders B1 and B2 (m = 2). Let us say
that the allowed set of price-values for the item are – $1, $2, and $3. Lets say that
the bidding states corresponding to these three bid values are
|ψ1〉 = |00〉+ |01〉√
2
|ψ2〉 = |00〉+ |10〉√
2
|ψ3〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√
2
(9)
The bidders choose their unitary operators U1 and U2 out of the set of
three unitary operators
{
U (1), U (2), U (3)
}
in order to generate their correspond-
ing bidding states by applying the operator on the two-qubit initialized state
|ψinit〉 = |00〉, viz. U (i)|00〉 = |ψi〉. The unitary operators can be implemented
by Hadamard and Controlled-not (CNOT) gates as shown in figure 1c. The fi-
nal Hamiltonian for the adiabatic search Hp is a 16 × 16 diagonal matrix, the
diagonal elements of which are negatives of the payoff values for the auction-
eer, F (x) for each of the 16 possible ‘allocations’ |x〉 represented as 16 × 1 unit-
vectors in the standard Kronecker basis. Given the payoff values in Table 1,
cSee Appendix A, for a discussion on why such a Hadamard-like construction guarantees that the
condition that the adiabatic search described in Eq. (7) always remains in the initial subspace of
the bidding states, |Ψ0〉
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Fig. 1. Two-qubit unitary operators U(i) that the bidders choose from, in order to generate their
‘bidding states’. U(i)|00〉 = |ψi〉, where |ψi〉 is the ‘bidding state’ corresponding to the bid value
of $i.
Hp = diag {0,−1,−2,−3,−1, 0, 0, 0,−2, 0, 0, 0,−3, 0, 0, 0}. Let us define the initial
Hamiltonian Hi ≡ UWU†, where W is a 16 × 16 diagonal matrix, that assigns a
0 eigenvalue to the initial state: |ψinit〉 ⊗ |ψinit〉 = |00〉 ⊗ |00〉, and higher eigenval-
ues to all other states. One possibility is to define a diagonal matrix W with the
diagonal elements being the Hamming weights of the state-vectors, in which case
W = diag{0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4} in the standard Kronecker basis.
In Figure 2, we compare the performance of the three approximations to the adi-
abatic algorithm — (a) when the exact expression for the interpolated Hamiltonian
(Eq. 6) is used, (b) when a zeroth order approximation (Eq. 7) is used, and (c) for a
first order approximation (Eq. 8). They are all discrete-time approximations of the
continuous-time adiabatic algorithm, with discretization parameters S = 40 and
∆ = 1. We find that the first-order approximation converges faster than the zeroth
order approximation. In a later section, we will find that we encounter very little
overhead in implementing the first-order-approximate version of the algorithm, as
compared to the zeroth-order-approximate version. In Figure 4, we plot the conver-
gence rates for the above two-bidder example, for all three possible pairs of possible
bid-values — {2, 3}, {1, 2}, and {1, 3} respectively. We used S = 20 and ∆ = 1.5
for these plots. It shows that the algorithm converges to the revenue-maximizing
solution irrespective of the actual bids placed. The convergence speed of adiabatic
search scales inversely with the minimum energy-gap gmin between the ground-state
and the first-excited-state eigenvalues of the interpolated Hamiltonian H(f) (see
Eq. 5). Figure 3 shows the four eigenvalues as a function of the number of iterations
s, when the bid values are $2 and $3. Its also worth noting that no matter how
high a value of S∆ one might choose, there is still a finite (even though vanishingly
small, as S∆→∞) probability that the quantum auctions protocol will not return
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Fig. 2. This figure compares the convergence rates of the adiabatic search algorithm applied to
the auctions problem for a simple case of two bidders bidding on a single item, for three cases —
(a) when the exact expression for the interpolated Hamiltonian (Eq. 5) is used, (b) when a zeroth
order approximation (Eq. 7) is used, and (c) for a first order approximation (Eq. 8). Each bidder
has two qubits to express their bid values and the price of the item can only take the values $1,
$2, and $3. In all the above plots, the bidders’ price values are $2 and $3 respectively, and S = 40,
∆ = 1. The x-axis is s ∈ [0, S] is the discrete index that interpolates between the Hamiltonians
Hi and Hp. The y-axis is the probability (as a function of s) that the auctioneer will pick the
maximum bidder as the winner if he makes a measurement on |Ψs〉.
the optimal value (i.e., highest bid) as the final outcome.
4. Quantum Circuit Implementations
We will first begin with deriving approximate circuit-level implementations of the
quantum auctions protocol for the simple 4-qubit example described in the previous
section. We will also sketch a scheme to implement the auctions protocol in gen-
eral. Let us split our discussion into three parts — (1) Bidders’ unitary operators
Ui’s, (2) the incremental initial Hamiltonian D(∆, f), and (3) the incremental final
Hamiltonian P (∆, f).
(1) Bidders’ unitary operators — These operators are the easiest to implement
using quantum circuits. We know that (in the absence of correlated bidding
preferences) the joint unitary operator U in Eq. 7 and Eq. 8 is a tensor product
of the bidders’ individual unitary operators Ui, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m. Each unitary
Ui is a p-qubit operator which essentially performs the 2-qubit “Hadamard”
operation in some 2-dimensional subspace of the Hilbert space of p qubits. To
be more specific, suppose we want to implement the unitary Ui that takes the
p-qubit state |00 · · · 0〉 to the p-qubit state |ψi〉 = |00101 · · · 01〉 where lets say
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Fig. 3. This figure shows the four eigenvalues of the interpolated Hamiltonian H(f) as a function
of the number of iterations s. f = s/S for s = 1, 2, · · · , S, where S = 20 is the total number of
iterations. It also shows the minimum gap gmin between the energy-values of the ground-state
and the first excited state of H(f). We plot here the four eigenvalues of H(f) for the particular
case when the bidders bid $2, and $3 on the item. The reason the eigenvalues do not cross is
that the other eigenstates are always uncoupled from these four, as the search never leaves the
initial subspacea. We can restrict our attention to the particular 4−by−4 subspace of the original
16− by − 16 matrix space – for a given choice of a pair of bid values.
t qubits with indices ik ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p} in |ψi〉 are |1〉 and the rest are |0〉. Lets
define imin = mintk=1 {ik}. One possible way to implement Ui is — Apply a
Hadamard operation H to qubit imin, followed by (t − 1) C-NOT operations
with the ithmin qubit as the control-qubit and the remaining t − 1 qubits ik as
the target qubits. For concrete examples, see Figure 5 and Figure 1.
(2) Incremental initial Hamiltonian D(∆, f) — This incremental Hamiltonian
is used by the auctioneer once in each iteration of the protocol. From the
discussion in section 3, we know that one way to realize the initial Hamiltonian
for the search problem is to have
D(∆, f) = e−i∆fW ,
where, W is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements being the Ham-
ming weights of the 2mp mp-qubit standard basis-vectors. In the case of the
4-qubit example in section 3, W = diag{0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4} in
the standard Kronecker basis. Consider the following matrix identity:
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Fig. 4. This figure shows the convergence of the adiabatic search algorithm applied to the auctions
problem for a simple case of two bidders bidding on a single item whose price can only take the
values $1, $2, and $3. Each bidder has two qubits to express their bid values. The solid red, green
and the dark-blue lines show the probability that the auctioneer will measure the winning-state
if he makes a measurement at the f th step of the adiabatic process, where f = s/S, for a total
of S = 20 steps and ∆ = 1.5. The three lines correspond to the convergence behavior for pairs of
bid values {2, 3}, {1, 2}, and {1, 3} respectively. The cyan line plots the probability that a corrupt
auctioneer will learn the bid-values of all bidders correctly, as a function of f , if he uses |00〉-
probe-states and a qubit-by-qubit measurement in the computational basis. The yellow line plots
the ‘learning curve’ of the corrupt auctioneer who uses two-qubit optimum joint measurement
(POVM) in order to learn the bid-values.
Fig. 5. This figure shows the quantum circuit to implement the unitary operator U for a bidder
to create a p-qubit bidding state (p = 6) starting from initialized state |ψinit〉 = |0〉⊗6. In this
example, U |0〉⊗6 = |010101〉.
(
1 0
0 e−iδ
)
⊗
(
1 0
0 e−iδ
)
=

1 0 0 0
0 e−iδ 0 0
0 0 e−iδ 0
0 0 0 e−i2δ

= exp(−iδ

0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 2
)
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Table 1. Auction payoffs for
two players B1 and B2 bid-
ding on one item. Each player
has two qubits. The ‘allocation’
|x〉 = |q1q2〉B1 |q3q4〉B2 has a
pay-
off given by F (x) = −〈x|Hp|x〉,
where Hp is a diagonal ma-
trix that constitutes the final
Hamiltonian of the adiabatic
search. A desirable final state
consists of only one player with
a nonzero bid (i.e., the winner
of the auction.) In other words,
F (x) 6= 0 only if |ψ〉B1 = |00〉B1
or |ψ〉B2 = |00〉B2 , but not
both.
|q1q2〉B1 |q3q4〉B2 F (x)
00 00 0
00 01 1
00 10 2
00 11 3
01 00 1
01 01 0
01 10 0
01 11 0
10 00 2
10 01 0
10 10 0
10 11 0
11 00 3
11 01 0
11 10 0
11 11 0
Extending this idea, it is easy to see that
D(∆, f) = e−i∆fW =
(
1 0
0 e−if∆
)⊗4
(10)
This method generalizes to mp > 4 qubits in an analogous fashion. Its worth
mentioning at this point that it just takes mp = 4 independent single-qubit
rotations to all the qubits, to implement D(∆, f), where f gets incremented by
1/S in each subsequent iteration of the protocol.
(3) Incremental final Hamiltonian P (∆, f) — Let us consider the following
arbitrary payoff table (table 2) where there are N qubits in total i1, i2, · · · , iN .
The last column P (i) lists the payoff values for the 2N N -qubit basis-states
|i1, i2, · · · , iN 〉. We want to come up with a 2N ×2N diagonal matrix Hp whose
diagonal values are the payoff values −P (i), i.e. 〈i|Hp|j〉 = −P (i)δij . It is easy
to see that, if Zk is the Pauli σz operator acting on the kth qubit, then Hp is
November 13, 2018 19:47 Quantum Auctions: IJQI auctions˙IJQI
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given by:
Table 2. Construction of Hp
for arbitrary payoff table
i1 i2 . . . iN P (i)
0 0 . . . 0 p00···0
0 0 . . . 1 p00···1
. . . . . . · · ·
1 1 . . . 1 p11···1
Hp =
1
2N
∑
i∈{2N}
(−P (i))
N∏
k=1
(
1 + (−1)ikZk
)
(11)
Now let us construct the final Hamiltonian Hp for the 4-qubit example above
(see table 1). If we renumber the 4 qubits |q1q2〉B1 |q3q4〉B2 as 1, 2, 3, and 4
respectively, we are led to the explicit construction:
Hp = − 14 (1 + Z1) (1 + Z2)
[
0 · 14 (1 + Z3) (1 + Z4) + 1 · 14 (1 + Z3) (1− Z4)
+ 2 · 14 (1− Z3) (1 + Z4) + 3 · 14 (1− Z3) (1− Z4)
]
− 14 (1 + Z3) (1 + Z4)
[
0 · 14 (1 + Z1) (1 + Z2) + 1 · 14 (1 + Z1) (1− Z2)
+ 2 · 14 (1− Z1) (1 + Z2) + 3 · 14 (1− Z1) (1− Z2)
]
= − 116 [(1 + Z1) (1 + Z2) (6− 4Z3 − 2Z4) + (1 + Z3) (1 + Z4) (6− 4Z1 − 2Z2)]
= − 116 [12 + 2Z1 + 4Z2 + 2Z3 + 4Z4 + 6Z1Z2 − 6Z2Z3
−8Z3Z1 − 6Z1Z4 − 4Z2Z4 + 6Z3Z4
−4Z1Z2Z3 − 2Z2Z3Z4 − 2Z1Z2Z4 − 4Z1Z3Z4] . (12)
Now, in order to implement the incremental final-Hamiltonian unitary operator
P (∆, f) = e−i∆fHp , let us apply the ‘zeroth’ order approximation (for ∆ 1)
when exponentiating the expression in Eq. 12, i.e.
P (∆, f) = e−i∆fHp ≈ ei3f∆/4eif∆Z1/8eif∆Z2/4 ×
eif∆Z3/8eif∆Z4/4ei3f∆Z1Z2/8 ×
e−i3f∆Z2Z3/8· · ·e−if∆Z1Z3Z4/4 (13)
Using the quantum circuit in Figure 6, we can implement any unitary operator
of the form eiZ⊗Z⊗···⊗Z∆ using only two-qubit operations (control-NOT and
phase gates) as shown in the figure. Hence, a collection of two-qubit gates can
be put together to construct the incremental final Hamiltonian P (∆, f).
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Fig. 6. This figure shows the quantum circuit to implement the unitary operator eiZ⊗Z⊗Z∆ on an
arbitrary 3-qubit state |ψ〉. This method can be readily generalized to implementing eiZ⊗Z⊗···⊗Z∆
using C-NOT (Control-NOT) and phase operations, both of which are 2-qubit unitary operators.
Cascade of such circuits can be used to construct the incremental final Hamiltonian P (∆, f).
5. The Corrupt Auctioneer
In this section, we are going to look at ways the security of the quantum auctions
protocol can be attacked by a corrupt auctioneer, whose intention is to learn the
bid values of all the bidders by deviating from the rules set by the auctions protocol
using adiabatic evolution. We will look at two major ways for a corrupt auctioneer
to attack the protocol, and will suggest ways to combat the problem. All discussion
in this section will pertain to the 4-qubit toy example elaborated in section 3, unless
stated otherwise. The extension of these ideas to the general case is straightforward.
5.1. Attack by measurement
(1) The attack mechanism: ‘probes and measurement’ — Imagine that every
time the auctioneer gets back the qubits from the bidders once they have applied
the joint Hermitian conjugate of their bidding operators U† = U†1 ⊗U†2 , instead
of operating the qubits with D(∆, 1 − f), he trashes all the qubits and sends
out fresh copies of the initialized state: |ψprobe〉 = |00〉 ⊗ |00〉. The bidders,
unaware of this, assume that the auctioneer is running the adiabatic evolution
as was promised, and apply their unitary bidding operators U = U1 ⊗ U2 on
the qubits. Now that the auctioneer has a tensor-product of two fresh copies
of the bidding states (Eq. A.1), he makes a symbol-by-symbol measurement on
each qubit in the computational basis, i.e. using the positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) elements {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|}. As each bidding state is an equal
superposition of |00〉 and the ‘price state’ of the bidders, the auctioneer learns
both the bidder’s bid-values with probability 1/4. If the auctioneer repeats the
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same exact procedure (sending |00〉 probe-states and making measurements on
the qubits thereafter) for N iterations of the protocol without being caught,
at the end of the N th iteration, he would have learnt the bid values of both
the bidders with probability (1− (1/2)N )2. This ‘learning-curve’ of the corrupt
auctioneer is the cyan line in Figure 4. Notice that even in this simple example,
even with this simple ‘attack’ on the protocol by the auctioneer, the auctioneer
finds out the bid values of the bidders much faster than the convergence of the
adiabatic auctions protocol. Hence, if the corrupt auctioneer is not caught, he
can pretend to be running the auctions protocol as prescribed, and stop at the
end of a stipulated number of iterations, and just decide the winner classically
(and correctly). So, whereas on one hand nobody has a reason to suspect him,
he learns all the bid-values of the losing bidders - hence compromising the
privacy of losing bidders.
The corrupt auctioneer can actually do better, if he has access to the machinery
to perform general 2-qubit measurements. Lets say the auctioneer sends out
probe states |ψprobe〉 = |00〉⊗|00〉 in each iteration of the protocol (as explained
in the above paragraph), and receives a tensor product of the two bidders’
bidding states (two out of the three states in Eq. A.1). The auctioneer optimizes
over all 3-element 2-qubit POVM elements Π ≡ {Π1,Π2,Π3} to distinguish
between the three possible bidding-states (Eq. A.1), and chooses the POVM
measurement Π∗ that minimizes the probability of making a wrong decision Pe
d. Let’s say the auctioneer uses Π∗ to measure both the bidders’ bidding-states.
The probability he learns the bid-values of both the bidders in one iteration
is (1 − Pe)2. If the auctioneer repeats sending out |ψprobe〉 in each iteration
of the protocol and keeps measuring the states he gets back from the bidders,
using the optimum POVM operators Π∗, afterN such iterations, the probability
that he learns both the bidders’ bid-values correctly is given by (1−PNe )2. This
‘learning-curve’ is the yellow line in Figure 4 (For this example, the optimum
measurement yields Pe = 0.1112). Notice that using an optimum measurement,
in this simple example, the auctioneer just needs about 4 iterations to learn
all the bid values almost perfectly. So, a corrupt auctioneer would just need
to ‘spread-out’ these cheating instants randomly in the 20 iterations of the
dFor readers not familiar with quantum POVM measurements, a good reference is Helstrom’s
book on “Quantum detection and estimation theory” 5. When POVM elements {Πj}Mj=1 are used
to distinguish between pure states {|ψi〉}Ni=1, the probability that the measurement outcome if j
given |ψi〉 was sent p(j|i) is given by, p(j|i) = 〈ψi|Πj |ψi〉. For distinguishing between mixed states
{ρi}Ni=1 using the same POVM elements, p(j|i) = Tr(Πjρi). In order to numerically obtain the
set of 3-element POVM operators that minimize the probability of error in distinguishing between
three pure states, we start with an arbitrary set of projective measurement operators (rank-1
operators corresponding to the self outer-products of a set of orthonormal vectors), and rotate the
entire set of three states we want to distinguish between, around each one of the measurement
vectors, minimizing probability of error in each iteration until convergence is reached. This greedy
algorithm is not guaranteed to work for any set of pure states. But, 5 gives a necessary criterion
that a probability of error minimizing POVM must meet, which is a good check.
November 13, 2018 19:47 Quantum Auctions: IJQI auctions˙IJQI
16 S. Guha, et. al.
adiabatic protocol, and he can choose the winner by a classical search.
(2) Countering the attack: ‘locking operators’ — The essence of using ‘lock-
ing operators’ is to rotate the bidding-states heavily towards the |00〉 state
and away from the ‘price-state’, so that it becomes harder for the corrupt
auctioneer to distinguish between the three different bidding-states by using
full-blown quantum measurements. To be more specific, consider an example
in which one bidder bids $2 and the other bidder bids $3. Hence the two bid-
ders’ bidding operators U1 and U2 are such that U1|00〉 = (|00〉+ |10〉)/
√
2 and
U2|00〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2. Now imagine that the two bidders come up with
two secretly chosen unitary operators V1 and V2, such that
V †1
( |00〉+ |10〉√
2
)
= α1|00〉+ β1|10〉
V †2
( |00〉+ |11〉√
2
)
= α2|00〉+ β2|11〉
with |αi| → 1, for i = 1, 2. If a bidder always ‘locks’ his bidding state using a V -
operator with α→ 1, the three possible bidding-states come very close to each
other in the Hamming space, making detection by measurement harder. Now,
consider expressing the final Hamiltonian Hp of the adiabatic search in a basis
defined by the unitary operator V ≡ V1⊗V2. So, the interpolated Hamiltonian
is given by H(f) = (1− f)Hb + fHf = (1− f)UWU† + fV HpV †. Hence, the
iterations of the adiabatic search will now look like:
|Ψs〉 = e−i∆H(f)|Ψs−1〉
= e−i∆((1−f)Hb+fHf )|Ψs−1〉
= e−i∆((1−f)UWU
†+fV HpV †)|Ψs−1〉
≈ e−i∆(1−f)UWU†e−i∆fV HpV † |Ψs−1〉
= U
(
e−i∆(1−f)W
)
U†V e−i∆fHpV †|Ψs−1〉
= UD(∆, 1− f)U†V P (∆, f)V †|Ψs−1〉 (14)
Observe that since the ‘locking operators’ do not take the bidding-states out
of the 2-dimensional subspace in which the bidders placed their bids originally,
by a careful choice of the locking operators (see Appendix A), the adiabatic
search still remains in the initial search subspace. The only potential problem
would occur, if the gmin of the new interpolated Hamiltonian H(f) = (1 −
f)Hb + fHf = (1 − f)UWU† + fV HpV † is very small. The convergence rate
with this modified version of the protocol will depend upon the gmin for the
new H(f). The new ‘learning-curve’ of the corrupt auctioneer (making symbol-
by-symbol measurements in the computational basis) will now be given by
(1− |α1|N )(1− |α2|N ), which will rise much slower with N as compared to the
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‘unprotected’ case (which corresponds to V = I2 ⊗ I2), where I2 is the 2 × 2
identity matrix). If the auctioneer knows before the fact, that such a protection
mechanism might exist with bidders using ‘locking’ operators Vi without the
auctioneer’s prior knowledge, the corrupt auctioneer would be deterred to use
the above cheating mechanism as he might be afraid of not being able to learn
the bid values of the bidders by the end of the S iterations, with significant
probability - hence making the incorrect (non-revenue-maximizing) allocation.
Observe that using this simple technique, the ‘learning-curve’ of the corrupt
auctioneer who only has access to single qubit projective measurements, can
be slowed down by a huge amount. But, if the auctioneer chooses to use a
more complicated two-qubit POVM, then the advantage of using this strategy
to counter the attack is less pronounced. For a concrete example on how the
auctioneer’s ‘learning-curve’ is slowed down by using ‘locking-operators’, see
Figure 7.
Fig. 7. This figure depicts how quickly a corrupt auctioneer can learn the bid values of all
the bidders by repeatedly secretly sending out fresh copies of initialized qubits to all bidders and
making projective measurements on the qubits he gets back from the bidders thereafter. The thick
lines correspond to (a) Blue line: convergence of the adiabatic protocol, (b) Red line: learning curve
of the corrupt auctioneer using single-qubit measurements on all qubits in the computational basis,
and (c) Green line: the learning curve of the corrupt auctioneer who uses the most optimum two-
qubit POVM to distinguish between possible bidding states. The thin curves are the corresponding
plots when both bidders use locking operators. Bidder 1 bids $3, and α1 = 0.9, and bidder 2 bids
$2 and α2 = 0.7. We see that in this example, not only are the learning curves of the corrupt
auctioneer ‘slowed down’ by using secret locking operators by the bidders, the convergence of the
adiabatic protocol has become faster.
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5.2. Attack using spurious Hamiltonian
(1) The attack mechanism: ‘revealing-states and spurious Hp’ — The
choice of the final Hamiltonian Hp depends on the payoff structure of the auc-
tions, and thus must be left to the discretion of the auctioneer. The revenue-
maximizing Hp we described in 3 assigns zero-payoff to what we termed
as ‘infeasible’ states. Imagine, that the auctioneer uses a final Hamiltonian
Hp = diag {0,−1,−2,−3,−1,−2,−3,−4,−2,−3,−4,−5, −3,−4,−5,−6}. A
‘revealing’ state is a state that contains information about bid values of both
bidders, for example |1011〉 is a ‘revealing’ state. The following payoff table
assigns maximum payoff values (thus minimum eigenvalues) to the revealing
states, so that the adiabatic search always converges to the revealing state in
the search-subspace. The payoff values for this spurious Hamiltonian are the
sum of the dollar-values of the two bidders’ basis states. The corrupt auctioneer
would thus always be able to converge to the revealing-state in the superpo-
sition of four states, as it will be the ‘ground’ state of the final Hamiltonian
in the search subspace. And when the auctioneer does the final measurement
on the qubits after S iterations of the adiabatic algorithm, he learns both the
bid values and then he can decide the winner classically. This form of attack is
seemingly very hard to detect, and as the auctioneer is still running the adia-
batic search, there is no reason for suspicion. See Table 3 for the payoff values
used by the corrupt auctioneer. As an example, if the bidders bid $2 and $3
respectively, the search would converge to the state |1011〉 rather than |0011〉,
so the auctioneer would first learn both the bid values by making a measure-
ment on all 4 qubits, and then he’ld pick the winner classically. Figure 8 shows
the convergence rate of the corrupt auctioneer to the ‘revealing-state’ |1011〉
when one bidder bids $2 and the other $3. Figure 9 shows the eigenvalues of
the interpolated Hamiltonian with the spurious Hp.
(2) Countering the attack: ‘removal of revealing states by collusion’ —
The above mode of attack can be countered if the bidders can somehow get rid
of the ‘revealing state’ from their joint bidding states. This can be achieved if
the suspecting bidders collude with each other in order to prepare their bidding-
states jointly. Lets say that bidder-1 bids $2 on the item and bidder-2 bids $3.
Their bidding operators are U1 and U2 respectively. All they need to do is to
agree to come together with their bidding operators U1 and U2 respectively, and
put them together with a rotation operatorR(√2/3,√1/3) and the controlled-
0 operations as shown in Figure 10. The rotation operator rotates the uniform
superposition state (|00〉 + |10〉)/√2 to the state √2/3|00〉 + √1/3|10〉. The
controlled-0 operation means that U2 is applied to the third and the fourth
qubits (the qubits that belong to bidder-2), only when both the qubits of the
first bidder are in their |0〉 states. So, now the joint unitary operator U of the
bidders is no longer a tensor product of U1 and U2. In each iteration of the
adiabatic algorithm, the bidders would need to use the additional apparatus
November 13, 2018 19:47 Quantum Auctions: IJQI auctions˙IJQI
Quantum Auctions 19
Table 3. A corrupt auctioneer
trying to pry on the bid-val-
ues of even the losing bidders,
might choose a different pay-
off metric, which would reveal
the bid-values of all the bidders.
Consider the following auction
payoffs for two players B1 and
B2 bidding on one item. Each
player has two qubits. The ‘allo-
cation’ |x〉 = |q1q2〉B1 |q3q4〉B2
has a pay-
off given by F (x) = −〈x|Hp|x〉,
where Hp is a diagonal matrix
that constitutes the final Hamil-
tonian of the adiabatic search.
A ‘revealing’ state is state that
contains information about bid
values of both bidders, for ex-
ample |1011〉 is a ‘revealing’
state. The following payoff ta-
ble assigns maximum payoff val-
ues to the revealing states, so
that the adiabatic search al-
ways converges to the reveal-
ing state in the search-subspace.
The payoff values for this spu-
rious Hamiltonian are the sum
of the dollar-values of the states
|x〉 = |q1q2〉B1 and |q3q4〉B2 .
|q1q2〉B1 |q3q4〉B2 F (x)
00 00 0
00 01 1
00 10 2
00 11 3
01 00 1
01 01 2
01 10 3
01 11 4
10 00 2
10 01 3
10 10 4
10 11 5
11 00 3
11 01 4
11 10 5
11 11 6
in Figure 10 to apply the U operator jointly. Note that now, even with the
spurious final Hamiltonian Hp, the auctioneer will not be able to read both the
bid values. But the auctioneer will still make the right decision, because the
state |0011〉 has the highest payoff (least eigenvalue) out of the three states in
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Fig. 8. This figure shows the convergence rate of the adiabatic search (using the spurious Hp of
the corrupt auctioneer) to the ‘revealing-state’ |1011〉 when one bidder bids $2 and the other $3.
After the adiabatic search is over, the auctioneer makes a measurement and finds out both the
bid values. He decides the winner by classical search.
Fig. 9. A plot of the eigenvalues of the interpolated Hamiltonian H(f) as a function of the
iteration number s, where f = s/S and S = 20 is the total number of iterations. These eigenvalues
correspond to the case when the spurious final Hamiltonian Hp is used by a corrupt auctioneer,
and when the bidders bid $2 and $3.
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the superposition in Figure 10 (ii).
Fig. 10. This figure shows how the bidders can collude to get rid of the ‘revealing-state’ (in this
case |1011〉) from the joint bidding state. Note that in order to do that, the bidders do not need to
reveal their bid values to each other. They just need to agree to come together with their bidding
operators U1 and U2 respectively, and put them together with a rotation operator R(
p
2/3,
p
1/3)
and the controlled-0 operations as shown in the figure. The rotation operator rotates the uniform
superposition state (|00〉+ |10〉)/√2 to the statep2/3|00〉+p1/3|10〉. The controlled-0 operation
means that U2 is applied to the third and the fourth qubits (the qubits that belong to bidder-2),
only when both the qubits of the first bidder are in their |0〉 states.
6. Conclusions
Quantum information technology offers a new paradigm for various economic mech-
anisms, such as the auction protocol discussed in this paper. It can improve on
pre-existing protocols by making them more secure, more efficient, or by adding
some novel privacy aspect to them. More generally, it provides a new framework
for economic games, with new optimum strategies and new ways of cheating for
the participants — with possible detrimental effects on economic outcomes. In the
context of auctions, the classical economic analysis usually is not concerned about
privacy of the bidders, and focuses exclusively on the bidders’ behavior under the
assumption that the auctioneer performs the auction as specified in the protocol.
However, playing the auction game with quantum hardware can improve the proto-
col by guaranteeing the privacy of the losing bidders. This added feature implicitly
treats the information about the bids as a valuable resource, and introduces a new
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incentive for the auctioneer to play the game dishonestly in order to learn that in-
formation. Therefore, the economic analysis of the auction game has to be carefully
reexamined.
Our discussion focused on methods that the auctioneer could use to learn more
information about the various bids than the honest protocol allows. In these scenar-
ios, we showed that the time required for the auctioneer to learn extra information
about the values of the bids could be made significantly shorter than the time re-
quired to complete the honest auction protocol — especially when the auctioneer
has access to a quantum computer — so that the bidders would have no way to
detect the dishonest behavior. In this case, the auction would be useful only to the
extent the bidders trust the auctioneer to behave correctly, although it would still
offer advantages over classical auctions, such as a unique way for the bidders to
correlate their bids. To reduce this required trust, we have described techniques by
which the bidders could significantly slow down the rate at which illicit informa-
tion is learned by the auctioneer during the protocol. In practice, whether these
techniques are sufficient to ensure the auctioneer’s honest behavior depends on the
context in which the auction is used. For instance, the value that the auctioneer
places on a reputation for correct behavior (e.g., to attract future business) could
be compared to the potential value of learning more about bidders’ preferences, or
the extent to which the auctioneer is risk averse (in the context of possible crim-
inal prosecution) could be considered. This observation also indicates a choice in
the search algorithm — in some cases it may be better to run the search for a
fewer number of steps, or use alternate heuristic search methods, which give the
auctioneer fewer opportunities to probe bidder states, even at the cost of somewhat
increased probability the highest bidder does not win due to error in the search.
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Appendix A. Comments on subspace search
As we observe in footnote a, the bidding operators Uj for each bidder can be
constructed in many different ways, leading to different bidding operators U that
can implement the adiabatic search for the auction protocol described in the paper.
For any arbitrary selection of the bidding operator U , it is NOT necessarily true
that the search procedure (as described in Eq. (7)) does not ever go out of the initial
subspace spanned by the vectors describing the bidding states of all the bidders,
|Ψ0〉. In this appendix, we show that the search indeed does remain in the span of
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the initial bidding states, if the bidders create the bidding operators by a special
Hadamard-like construction.
For sake of simplicity, we would like to allude to the 4-qubit two-bidder “toy
example” that we refer to, in Section 3 of the paper. Let us consider the construction
of the bidding operators U (1), U (2), and U (3) shown in Fig. 1. that create the three
bidding states |ψi〉 = U (i)|00〉, by action on the initially distributed state |00〉:
|ψ1〉 = |00〉+ |01〉√
2
|ψ2〉 = |00〉+ |10〉√
2
|ψ3〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√
2
. (A.1)
The conditions specified by Eqns. (A.1) only specify the first column of each
unitary operator U (i) in the standard Kronecker basis. Hence, there can be multiple
possible ways to extend the first column into a complete-orthonormal (CON) set
of (four) basis vectors (4-length column vectors) to construct the unitary matrices.
We use the standard Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process to extend the first
column to a Hadamard-like construction. These constructions can be summarized
in quantum-circuit notation by the circuits shown in Fig. 1. The Hadamard matrix
is given by
H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
. (A.2)
Using this construction (as can be also verified by explicit calculations of the output
states for the circuits in Fig. 1), we obtain the following unitary bidding operators
U (i):
U (1) =
1√
2

1 1 0 0
1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 −1
 (A.3)
U (2) =
1√
2

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 −1 0
0 1 0 −1
 (A.4)
U (3) =
1√
2

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 −1
1 0 −1 0
 (A.5)
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Note that such a Hadamard-like construction of unitary bidding operators is
always possible even in a more general case of more than two bidders and more
number of qubits. The overall bidding operator is given by U = U1 ⊗U2, where U1
and U2 are bidding operators of the two bidders. The adiabatic iterations are given
by:
|Ψs〉 = UD(∆, 1− f)U†P (∆, f)|Ψs−1〉, (A.6)
where D(∆, 1 − f) = e−i∆(1−f)W and P (∆, f) = e−i∆fHp are diagonal unitary
matrices with unit-magnitude phase-terms as their diagonal entries. We will see in
the following subsection, that given the above construction of the U ’s, the adiabatic
iterations preserve the initial search subspace. As an example, if bidder 1 bids $2,
and bidder 2 bids $3, i.e. U1 = U (2), U2 = U (3), and U = U† = U1 ⊗ U2, then
at each iteration step s, the state |ψs〉 is in the span of the vectors |0000〉, |0011〉,
|1000〉, and |1011〉.
Hadamard construction of U preserves search subspace
Our goal in this section is to show that the Hadamard-like construction of the
bidders’ unitary operator U described above preserves the search subspace. In other
words, we want to show that, with our construction of U , UD(∆, 1−f)U† preserves
the subspace spanned by the initial basis-states in the uniform superposition |Ψ0〉.
In order to start the search in the right state, we want U to map the initial
state |Ψinit〉 = |0000〉 to the uniform superposition, |Ψ0〉 = (1/2)(|00〉 + |0b2〉 +
|b10〉 + |b1b2〉e. An equivalent way of saying this is that we want U† to map the
state (1/2)(|00〉+ |0b2〉+ |b10〉+ |b1b2〉 onto |00〉. Then UD(∆, 1− f)U† sends
(1/2)(|00〉 + |0b2〉 + |b10〉 + |b1b2〉 onto itself. Because P (∆, f) = e−i∆fHp is a
diagonal matrix, it preserves span(|00〉, |0b2〉, |b10〉, |b1b2〉). So, all we want now
is that UD(∆, 1− f)U† also preserves the above initial bidding subspace.
As UD(∆, 1 − f)U† sends (1/2)(|00〉 + |0b2〉 + |b10〉 + |b1b2〉 onto it-
self, one way to construct a U that also preserves the subspace given by
span(|00〉, |0b2〉, |b10〉, |b1b2〉), is to enforce U† to map 3 mutually orthogonal
linear combinations of the vectors {(|00〉, |0b2〉, |b10〉, |b1b2〉} (each of which are
also orthogonal to (1/2)(|00〉 + |0b2〉 + |b10〉 + |b1b2〉) onto orthogonal eigen-
states of operator D(∆, 1−f) (which are just the computational basis states). This
way, UD(∆, 1 − f)U† will map each one of these linear combinations onto itself,
albeit with an added phase factor coming from the corresponding eigenvalue of
D(∆, 1 − f). Moreover, now because UD(∆, 1 − f)U† maps an orthonormal basis
of the subspace span(|00〉, |0b2〉, |b10〉, |b1b2〉) onto the subspace, it would map
any arbitrary linear combination of the vectors {|00〉, |0b2〉, |b10〉, |b1b2〉} to an-
other linear combination of these same vectors. Thus, with such a choice of U , the
eHere we use the shorthand notation |0〉 to denote the two-qubit state |00〉. |b1〉 and |b2〉 denote
one out of 3 possible non-zero bid values (|01〉, |10〉 or |11〉) for bidder 1 and bidder 2 respectively.
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adiabatic search process described by Eq. (A.6) will never leave the initial ‘bidding
subspace’.
The Hadamard-like construction we are implementing is one example of this
method, where we choose the 3 remaining linear combinations to be:
(1/2)(|00〉+ |0b2〉 − |b10〉 − |b1b2〉,
(1/2)(|00〉 − |0b2〉+ |b10〉 − |b1b2〉, and
(1/2)(|00〉 − |0b2〉 − |b10〉+ |b1b2〉.
We could also pick some other 3 linear combinations, but the above work as desired
by the protocol.
Choice of locking operators
A similar consideration as above arises for the modified adiabatic search protocol
when the bidders use ‘locking operators’ (14). By a specific choice of the lock-
ing operators, we can again always ensure that the adiabatic iterations remain in
the initial search subspace. Referring to the specific case elaborated in the paper
(Eq.(14)), we construct the matrices V1, and V2 in the following manner (in the
standard computational Kronecker basis):
V1 = V
†
1 =

cos θ1 0 sin θ1 0
0 cos θ1 0 sin θ1
sin θ1 0 − cos θ1 0
0 sin θ1 0 − cos θ1
 and (A.7)
V2 = V
†
2 =

cos θ2 0 0 sin θ2
0 cos θ2 sin θ2 0
0 sin θ2 − cos θ2 0
sin θ2 0 0 − cos θ2
 , (A.8)
such that,
cos θi + sin θi = αi, and (A.9)
cos θi − sin θi = βi, (A.10)
for i = 1, 2. With the above choice of the ‘locking operators’, it is again easy to see
why the iterative search procedure (Eq. (14)) will never go outside the subspace
spanned by the allocation vectors in the initial state.
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